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pricing serve as our control group. We find that RP leads to lower relative prices, with
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1 Introduction
In pharmaceutical markets new innovations are protected by patents that restrict compet-
ing firms from copying the innovation within a certain period. When the patent expires,
competing firms may enter the market with generic products. The generic versions contain
exactly the same active chemical ingredient and must prove therapeutic equivalence before
they can be launched on the market. Since generics have the same therapeutic eﬀect as the
brand-name, one would expect that only relative prices matter for the consumers’ choice
of drug, and thus that generic entry would trigger fierce competition between brand-names
and generics. This is, however, not what is happening. A robust empirical regularity is
that the brand-names charge a higher price than their generic versions and still obtain
positive market shares (e.g., Scherer, 2000). Some studies show that brand-name prices
even increase when the patent expires and generics enter the market (Grabowski and Ver-
non, 1992, Frank and Salkever, 1997). This phenomenon has been labelled the generic
paradox.
Given that profits earned under the patent period are suﬃcient for the brand-name
producer to recoup its R&D costs, the eﬃcient outcome in the post-patent period should
be prices equal to marginal production costs, taking into account that brand-names and
generics are identical products and provide similar health gains to consumers. Thus, from
a policy perspective, the large market share of higher priced brand-names relative to their
generic versions is an unsatisfactory outcome.
Most Western countries, except for the US, regulate pharmaceutical prices directly or
indirectly in order to control pharmaceutical expenditures.1 ,2 The rationale for regulation
is that price competition in pharmaceutical markets is weak, mainly due to substantial
medical insurance. Danzon and Chao (2000) argue, however, that regulation drives out
competition and is thus counter-productive in obtaining cost-savings. They base their
1Danzon (1997) provides a thorough overview of theory and practice of price regulation in the phar-
maceutical industry. See also Kanavos (2001) for a comprehensive overview of pharmaceutical regulation
practices in 14 EU countries.
2The recent inclusion of prescription drugs in Medicare has spurred a debate of price controls also in
the US (e.g., Huskamp et al, 2000, Kanavos and Reinhardt, 2003). In addition, (generic) reference pricing
is well-established through the "maximum allowable charge" programs used by, e.g., Medicaid.
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conclusion on a cross-national study using data for 1992, showing that price competition
between generic competitors is stronger in unregulated or less regulated markets (United
States, United Kingdom, Canada, and Germany) than in countries with strict price or
reimbursement regulations (France, Italy, and Japan).
Our research agenda is highly parallel. In the present paper we analyse the relationship
between regulation, competition and pharmaceutical prices both theoretically and empiri-
cally. The theory model allows us to analyse price competition between brand-names and
generics under price cap regulation, reference pricing, as well as the benchmark case of free
pricing, and to derive empirically testable hypotheses. The empirical part of the paper
exploits a unique policy experiment in Norway, where the government exposed a subsam-
ple of the oﬀ-patent drugs on the market to reference pricing. The policy reform is thus
a natural experiment that provides us with a comparison group consisting of oﬀ-patent
drugs subject to price cap regulation throughout the whole period. We use a rich product
level panel data set covering a four-year period from 2001 to 2005 that gives us variation
over time (before and after the reform) and across products that are subject to diﬀerent
regulatory regimes (price cap or reference pricing).
Our empirical analysis is divided into three parts. First, we examine the impact of
reference pricing on relative prices, measured as the ratio of brand-name and generic
prices. Our results show a negative, though weak, significant eﬀect on relative prices. A
possible explanation could be price convergence towards the reference price, as suggested
by, e.g., Danzon and Liu (1996) and Danzon and Ketcham (2004). However, when we
decompose the eﬀect by looking at brand-name and generic prices separately, we find that
reference pricing not only reduces brand-name prices but also generic prices. The reason
that relative prices decline due to reference pricing is that brand-names prices drop more
than generic prices.
In the theory section, we show that price convergence towards the reference price
happens only if the reference price is exogenous, i.e., fixed at a some level between brand-
name and generic prices. If the reference price, however, is a function of the prices, and
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thus endogenous, then a generic producer has a strategic incentive to lower its price in
order to reduce the reference price, making the brand-name drug relatively more expensive.
Since the reference price in Norway was calculated as a weighted average of brand-name
and generic prices, this would explain why we do not observe price convergence in our
data.3
Second, we analyse the impact of reference pricing on generic competition, measured
inversely by brand-name market shares, as, for instance, Aronsson et al. (2001).4 The
eﬀect of reference pricing on generic competition is not a priori evident. Reference pricing
changes the co-payment structure, making the brand-name drug relatively more expensive
than the generics, which increase generics’ market share for given prices. However, the
brand-names respond to reference pricing by lowering their prices in order to retain their
market shares. The net eﬀect on market shares is thus determined by the relative strengths
of these two counteracting eﬀects.
Our estimations show that reference pricing leads to a significant and substantial (al-
most 14 percent) reduction in brand-name market shares, controlling for changes in rela-
tive prices. We can thus interpret this result as a direct demand response (for given drug
prices) to the change in co-payment structure brought about by the introduction of ref-
erence pricing. The brand-name price reductions pull in the opposite direction. We find,
however, no significant eﬀect of changes in relative branded—generic prices on brand-name
market-shares. Thus, the direct demand response of the radical change in the co-payment
structure of due to reference pricing by far outweighs any indirect eﬀect via the price
responses.
Finally, we quantify the eﬀect reference pricing has on average prices at molecule level,
using the market shares of brand-names and generics as weights. Qualitatively, the im-
pact on average prices is evident, since we have established that reference pricing leads
to lower brand-name and generic prices and lower brand-name market shares. However,
3 In most countries that adopt reference pricing, the reference price is determined endogenously as a
function of one or more drug prices in the relevant market (see, e.g., Lopez-Casasnovas and Puig-Junoy,
2000).
4Alternatively, we could measure the eﬀect on the number of generic competitors, the Herfindahl-index,
etc. The measures are, however, highly correlated and provides qualitatively similar results.
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for policy implications it is of interest to quantify the eﬀect. Our estimations show that
reference pricing lowers average molecule prices with more than 30 percent. This is an
impressive reduction, especially taking into account that Norway has a relatively strict
price cap regime. Provided that total drug demand is highly price inelastic, this result
suggests significant cost-savings.5 There are two diﬀerent eﬀects that contribute to these
cost-savings: as described above, we find that the introduction of reference pricing leads
to (i) a reduction of both brand-name and generic drug prices, and (ii) a shift in demand
from brand-names to generics. The decomposed eﬀects suggest that a substantial part of
the cost-savings can be attributed to the second eﬀect: a shift in demand from brand-name
to generic drugs. Thus, reference pricing stimulates generic competition and reduces phar-
maceutical prices, and is therefore clearly favourable compared with price cap regulation
in the oﬀ-patent market.
A highly related paper is Aronsson et al. (2001) who use Swedish data to analyse the
impact of relative brand-name and generic prices, as well as reference pricing, on brand-
name market shares.6 They find only weak eﬀects of relative prices and reference pricing
on brand-name market shares. Estimating the eﬀects on the whole sample (12 molecules),
provide no significant eﬀects of reference pricing or relative prices on brand-name market
shares. They therefore run regressions at molecule level, finding significant eﬀects for only
5 out of 12 molecules.
Our study diﬀer from theirs in several ways. First, the policy reform in Norway is a
natural experiment, which provides us with a control group of pharmaceuticals. In Sweden
reference pricing was introduced for all substances with generic competition, implying that
Aronsson et al. (2001) must rely on before-after estimation. Second, we make use of a
much more extensive data set with 24 molecules with monthly price and volume data.
Third, we extend their analysis by estimating the eﬀect on brand-name and generic prices
5Several empirical studies have documented that demand for pharmaceuticals are highly price inelastic
(e.g., Newhouse, 1993). This suggests that average prices at the molecule level are good proxies for potential
cost savings (see also Danzon and Chao, 2000).
6Aronsson et al. (2001) interpret relative prices as a measure of generic competition. This seems highly
unprecise since lower relative prices might be due to higher generic prices, which would hardly be equivalent
to stronger generic competition. We follow the mainstream by measuring generic competition by either
the generic market share or the number of generic competitors.
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separately, such that we can identify the driving force behind relative price changes. More
importantly, we address the policy implications more directly by looking at the eﬀects on
average prices at molecule level, which is not a part of their study. Finally, in contrast
to Aronsson et al. (2001), our analysis find strong eﬀects of reference pricing on generic
competition (market shares) and pharmaceutical prices.
Our paper is also related to the literature on the impact of regulation on pharmaceutical
firms’ pricing strategies. Pavcnik (2002) studies the introduction of (therapeutic) reference
pricing in Germany in 1989, focusing on the change in patients’ out-of-pocket expenses.
Using data for two diﬀerent therapeutic fields (oral antidiabetics and antiulcerants) for
1986 to 1996, she identifies significant price reductions of the reference price system on
both brand-names and generics, with the eﬀect being stronger for brand-names. She also
finds that brand-names with more generic competitors reduced prices more. Brekke et
al. (2007a) provide a similar type of study, exploiting the same policy experiment as
the present paper, but using a data set with on-patent products and substantially fewer
oﬀ-patent molecules. Their findings are similar to Pavcnik (2002) with respect to brand-
name and generic price responses to reference pricing. However, Brekke et al. (2007a)
also considers cross-price eﬀects on therapeutic substitutes not exposed to reference prices,
finding that price reductions on referenced drugs trigger lower prices on their therapeutic
substitutes, a result that is relevant for patent protection and innovation, as well as the
trade-oﬀ between co-payments and health gains (see also Brekke et al. 2007b).7
While the above-mentioned studies are related, they obviously focus on diﬀerent as-
pects than we do in the present paper. Importantly, they are not concerned with the
impact of regulation on generic competition. This is an important aspect when evaluat-
ing the performance of regulatory reforms in terms of cost-savings, which is the primary
policy goal in the pharmaceutical oﬀ-patent market. Our study, thus, complements the
mentioned studies by estimating the eﬀects of reference pricing relative to price cap reg-
7There is also a paper by Bergman and Rudholm (2003) that studies the price eﬀects of the Swedish
reference price system, providing similar figures as Pavcnik (2002) and Brekke et al. (2007a). Distinguishing
between actual and potential generic competition, they find that reference pricing only reduced prices of
those brand-names that faced actual generic competition.
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ulation on generic competition. We also extend the previous literature by estimating the
eﬀects of regulation on average prices at molecule level, so that potential cost-savings can
be analysed, and thus policy implications can be discussed more directly.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In Section 2 we develop a theoretical
model and derive predictions for the empirical analysis. In Section 3 we present some
institutional background by describing the price cap regulation and the policy experiment
with reference pricing in Norway. In Section 4 we present our data and some descriptive
statistics. In Section 5 we present the empirical method and results with respect to relative
prices, brand-name market shares, and average prices at molecule level. Finally, Section
6 concludes the paper.
2 A theoretical model
We can capture some main mechanisms of generic drug competition by applying a simple
vertical product diﬀerentiation model. Consider a therapeutic market with products of-
fered by two firms. Firm B oﬀers the original (oﬀ-patent) brand-name drug b, while firm
G oﬀers a generic substitute g. Consumers are heterogeneous with respect to the gross
valuation of drug treatment, represented by a parameter τ which is uniformly distributed
on the interval [0, t]. It would be natural to think of the heterogeneity of gross valuations
as reflecting diﬀerences in severity levels, but it could also be interpreted as diﬀerences
in prescription practices among physicians.8 The total mass of consumers is given by M .
Each consumer demands either one or zero units of the most preferred drug. The utility
derived from no drug consumption is zero, while a consumer who buys one unit of drug i
obtains a net utility
Ui =
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎩
θτ − cb if i = b
τ − cg if i = g
, (1)
8For example, pharmaceutical detailing might influence a physician’s willingness to prescribe a cheaper
generic substitute.
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where θ > 1 is the (perceived) quality diﬀerence — e.g., due to diﬀerences in advertising
intensity — between the brand-name and the generic drug, and ci is the patient co-payment
for drug i.9
A consumer with a positive net utility of drug consumption will choose the most
preferred drug version by trading oﬀ drug quality against drug co-payment. The higher
the gross valuation of drug treatment, the more the consumer is willing to pay in order to
purchase the (high-quality) brand-name drug. A consumer who is indiﬀerent between the
two drug versions has a gross valuation equal to bτ , given by θbτ − cb = bτ − cg, yielding
bτ = cb − cg
θ − 1 . (2)
Consumers with a gross valuation higher than bτ demand the brand-name drug, while
the remaining consumers demand the generic drug, as long as the net utility of drug
consumption is non-negative. Total demand for the two drug versions are thus given by
Db =
M
t
(t− bτ) , (3)
Dg =
M
t
(bτ − cg) . (4)
From these demand functions we can define the market share of the generic drug,
γg =
Dg
Db +Dg
. (5)
Assuming, for simplicity, that marginal production costs of both drug versions are zero,
profits are given by
πi = piDi, (6)
9As mentioned in the Introduction, there is strong empirical evidence that generic drugs are not
perceived to be perfect substitutes to the original brand-name drug, despite being chemically identical.
The findings of substantial and persistent branded-generic price diﬀerences after generic entry (see, e.g.,
Grabowski and Vernon, 1992, Frank and Salkever, 1997, Scott Morton, 2000) fit well with predictions of
vertical diﬀerentiation models. Two recent papers applying this approch to branded-generic competition
are Königbauer (2007) and Brekke et al. (2007b).
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where pi is the price of drug i; i = b, g. Given the restrictions imposed by the regulatory
regime in place, we assume that the two firms play a Bertrand game, simultaneously
choosing drug prices to maximise profits.
2.1 No regulation
As a benchmark for comparison, consider the case of no regulation, where firms are free
to choose drug prices and patient co-payment is given by
ci = f + αpi, (7)
where f > 0 is a fixed fee, α ∈ (0, 1) is the coinsurance rate and pi is the price of drug i.10
To make sure that both firms are active in equilibrium, we impose the condition f < t2 .
The first-order conditions for profit maximising drug prices yield the following best-
response functions for the producers of the brand-name and generic drug, respectively:
pb (pg) =
1
2
µ
pg +
t (θ − 1)
α
¶
, (8)
pg (pb) =
1
2θ
µ
pb −
f (θ − 1)
α
¶
. (9)
The best-response functions confirm that drug prices are strategic complements; a higher
brand-name drug price induces a higher generic drug price, and vice versa.
Under free pricing, equilibrium drug prices are found by simultaneously solving (8)-(9),
yielding
p∗g =
(θ − 1) (t− 2f)
α (4θ − 1) , (10)
p∗b =
(θ − 1) (2tθ − f)
α (4θ − 1) . (11)
10A copayment system with a fixed and a variable component is common for many countries (see,
e.g., Kanavos, 2001). Notice, however, that the parameters α and f can be given several alternative
interpretations. For example, α could be interpreted as the prescribing physician’s price consciousness
(see, e.g., Hellerstein, 1998), while f can be interpreted also as the (non-monetary) cost of attending a GP
to obtain a prescription.
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Since the brand-name drug is perceived to be of higher quality than the generic drug, firm
B will set the higher price, p∗b > p
∗
g, and serve the consumers with higher gross valuation
of drug treatment. The larger the degree of perceived vertical diﬀerentiation, θ, the larger
the branded-generic price diﬀerence in equilibrium.
2.2 Price cap regulation
The equilibrium outcome under price cap regulation is a straightforward modification of
the free pricing equilibrium derived above. If the producer of the brand-name drug faces
a binding price cap, pb, set by a regulator, the equilibrium generic drug price is given by
(9), with pb = pb . Stricter price regulation makes the brand-name drug less expensive for
consumers, inducing — all else equal — a shift in demand towards drug b. However, since
prices are strategic complements, firm G will respond by lowering the price of the generic
drug. An assessment of the total eﬀect shows that the former (direct) eﬀect dominates
the latter (indirect) eﬀect:
∂γg
∂pb
=
2θ2α (t− f)
(θ − 1) (f (1 + θ)− 2tθ + αpb)2
> 0. (12)
Proposition 1 Under price cap regulation, a reduction in the (binding) price cap reduces
the equilibrium market share of generics.
In other words, stricter price cap regulation dampens generic competition. If price
cap regulation is suﬃciently strict, generic competition will be completely eliminated.
The critical price cap, below which the generic producer will exit the market, is given
by pb =
f(θ−1)
α . We see that the likelihood of price cap regulation driving out generic
competition is increasing in the degree of perceived vertical diﬀerentiation and the fixed
cost of drug consumption, while decreasing in the degree of co-insurance.
2.3 Reference pricing
Under a reference pricing (RP) system, firms are free to set drug prices, but patient co-
payment is based on a reference price, r, that is set by a regulator. More specifically, if a
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consumer chooses a drug that is priced higher than the reference price, she has to pay the
full diﬀerence between the reference price and the actual drug price. Usually, the reference
price is set at a level somewhere between the lowest and highest drug price in the market.
For a reference price r ∈ (pg, pb), the co-payment schedule is given by
cb = αr + (pb − r) + f, (13)
cg = αpg + f. (14)
In order to illustrate the decomposed eﬀects of RP on drug pricing and generic com-
petition, we will do the analysis in two steps. Assume first that the firms perceive the
reference price to be exogenously given. For r ∈ (pg, pb), equilibrium prices are then given
by
prpg (r) =
(t− 2f) (θ − 1)− r (1− α)
α (4θ − 1) , (15)
prpb (r) =
(θ − 1) (2tθ − f) + r (2θ − 1) (1− α)
4θ − 1 . (16)
We can analyse the eﬀects of RP by considering a marginal reduction in r. RP implies that
the brand-name drug becomes relatively more expensive, and that drug demand becomes
more elastic for prices above r. The resulting pricing responses are easily derived from
(15)-(16): ∂prpg /∂r < 0 and ∂p
rp
b /∂r > 0.
Proposition 2 Under reference pricing, if the firms perceive the reference price to be
exogenous, a reduction in the reference price leads to a reduction (increase) in the brand-
name (generic) drug price.
In other words, the introduction of reference pricing leads to a price convergence to-
wards the reference price; the generic drug becomes more expensive, while the brand-name
drug becomes cheaper. This is in line with the hypothesis that prices tend to converge
towards the reference price.11
11See, e.g., Danzon and Liu (1996) and Danzon and Ketcham (2004).
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However, this hypothesis ignores the fact that, in most reference pricing systems, the
reference price is determined as a function of actual drug prices and is thus endogenous. If
the reference price is frequently updated, the drug producers know that their price setting
is going to aﬀect the reference price, and thereby demand and profits, in the future. A
simple way to capture this eﬀect is to define the reference price as a weighted average of
the brand-name and generic drug prices:
r = βpg + (1− β) pb. (17)
When the firms are able to influence the reference price through their price setting, a new
and counteracting incentive for the generic producer is introduced. As before, reference
pricing makes the brand-name drug more expensive, giving the generic producer an incen-
tive to raise prices. However, the generic producer can make the brand-name drug even
more expensive by lowering the price of the generic drug, since this automatically reduces
the reference price. Equilibrium prices are now given by
prpg =
(t− 2f) (θ − 1)
3β (1− α) + α (4θ − 1) , (18)
prpb =
(θ − 1) (α (2tθ − f) + β (1− α) (2t− f))
(α+ β (1− α)) (3β (1− α) + α (4θ − 1)) . (19)
It is also interesting to consider relative prices, denoted ω := pbpg , which, in equilibrium,
are given by
ωrp =
α (2tθ − f) + β (1− α) (2t− f)
(t− 2f) (α (1− β) + β) . (20)
We can analyse the eﬀects of reference pricing by considering a marginal increase in
β. The equilibrium price responses of RP are given by
∂prpg
∂β
= − 3 (θ − 1) (t− 2f) (1− α)
(α (4θ − 1) + 3β (1− α))2
< 0, (21)
∂prpb
∂β
= − (θ − 1) (1− α) [2tΩ− 3fΦ]
Φ (α (4θ − 1) + 3β (1− α))2
< 0, (22)
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where
Ω := α2 + 3β2 (1− α)2 + 2θα2 (2θ − 1) + 6θαβ (1− α)
and
Φ := (α+ β (1− α))2 < Ω.
Thus, endogenising the reference price completely reverts the price response of the generic
producer, implying that RP leads to price reductions for brand-name and generic drugs.
The eﬀect on relative prices is given by
∂ω
∂β
= − 2tα (θ − 1) (1− α)
(t− 2f) (α (1− β) + β)2
< 0, (23)
implying that the price reduction is stronger, in absolute terms, for the brand-name drug.
A closer scrutiny of (23) shows that the fall in relative prices is stronger the lower the
degree of co-insurance (α) and the higher the fixed cost of drug consumption (f).
What is the eﬀect of RP on generic competition, measured by the generic market
share? The above analysis suggests that there are two counteracting forces:
(i) For given relative drug prices, RP generally leads to an increase in the relative
co-payment rate, which is given by
μ (pb, pg) :=
cb (pb, pg)
cg (pb, pg)
=
f + αpb + β (pb − pg) (1− α)
f + αpg
. (24)
The eﬀect of RP is then given by
∂μ (pb, pg)
∂β
=
(pb − pg) (1− α)
f + αpg
> 0. (25)
The strength of this eﬀect is decreasing in both f and α. Indeed, in the absence of insur-
ance, i.e., α → 1, there is obviously no eﬀect of RP on relative co-payments. Generally,
though, as long as α < 1, RP induces a shift in consumption — for given drug prices —
from brand-name to generic drugs.
(ii) The positive relationship between RP and relative co-payments is, at least partly,
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compensated for by a reduction in relative drug prices, as shown by (23). All else equal,
this eﬀects leads to a shift of consumption from generic to brand-name drugs. The overall
eﬀect on market shares is thus a priori ambiguous.
Combining the two above mentioned eﬀects, the overall impact of RP on generic com-
petition is
∂γrpg
∂β
=
fα (θ − 1) (1− α) (t− 2f)
(α (3tθ − f (1 + 2θ)) + 3β (1− α) (t− f))2
> 0. (26)
Thus, in our parameterized model, the increase in the relative co-payment rate is not
outweighed by the drop in relative drug prices, implying that RP leads to an increase in the
generic market share. It is also straightforward to confirm that the positive eﬀect of RP on
generic market shares is weaker the higher the degree of coinsurance, i.e., ∂2γrpg /∂α∂β < 0.
Notice also that the net eﬀect of RP on generic market shares is zero if f = 0. Thus, in
the special case of no fixed costs of drug consumption, the direct eﬀect of RP on relative
co-payments is fully oﬀset by a subsequent drop in relative drug prices.
We summarise as follows:
Proposition 3 Assume that the reference price is endogenously determined as a function
of the drug prices in the market. A higher weight attached to the low-priced generic drug,
implying all else equal a reduction in the reference price, will then generally lead to (i)
a reduction in both brand-name and generic drug prices, (ii) a reduction in relative drug
prices, (iii) an increase in the market share of generic drugs.
When assessing the eﬀect of RP on generic competition, we have, by considering mar-
ginal changes in β, implicitly compared the outcome with the free pricing equilibrium,
since this equilibrium coincides with the RP equilibrium in the limit β → 0. However,
notice that, since a binding price cap reduces generic competition (compared with free
pricing), the positive eﬀect of RP on generic market shares would be even larger if we
compared with a price cap equilibrium. The drug pricing responses of replacing price cap
regulation with RP are less clear, and depends on the strictness of price cap regulation.
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If the price cap is suﬃciently low, we cannot rule out the possibility that replacing this
regulatory system with RP will increase drug prices. However, the fact that we observe
generic competition in markets with price cap regulation suggests that, in reality, the price
cap is generally set well above marginal production costs. Furthermore, the descriptive
data from the policy experiment we exploit in the subsequent empirical analysis does not
suggest that this is a relevant case.
Thus, based on the above theoretical analysis and discussion, the hypotheses we pos-
tulate for the empirical analysis follows from Proposition 3:
(i) Switching from price cap regulation to RP leads to an increase in generic market
shares.
(ii) Given that price cap regulation is not excessively strict, switching from price cap
regulation to RP leads to a reduction in brand-name and generic drug prices and a
reduction in relative drug prices.
3 Institutional background
The Norwegian pharmaceutical market is, as most other Western pharmaceutical markets,
extensively regulated. The regulatory body is the Norwegian Ministry of Health and Care
Services and its agency called the Norwegian Medicines Agency. Norway has adopted the
European patent law system to a large extent, implying that all new chemical entities
are subject to patent protection for a given period. To launch their products on the
Norwegian market, pharmaceutical firms need a government approval. The approval is
based on (clinical) evidence showing that the drug is not dangerous and has a positive
health eﬀect. To get the drug listed for reimbursement (blue list), the pharmaceutical
firms must in addition provide evidence of a positive cost-benefit analysis.
All prescription drugs (reimbursable or not) are subject to price control. The current
system is a price cap scheme based on international reference pricing, also called external
referencing. This system was introduced in 2000, and covers all prescription drugs, both
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on-patent and oﬀ-patent, except for those included in the reference price system. The
government requires that a producer that sells a prescription drug on the Norwegian
market, reports the foreign prices of this drug in a defined set of "comparable" countries.12
The price cap, which is the maximum domestic price a producer can charge for its product,
is then set equal to the average of the three lowest reported foreign prices of this drug.
Generic versions receive the same price cap as the brand-names, but the price cap rarely
binds as they are typically priced lower than the brand-name. The price cap is imposed
at the wholesale level. The government then defines a maximum mark-up the pharmacies
can charge, which in turn determines the price cap at the retail level for each product.
The reference price system, called index pricing, was introduced in March 2003 for
a subsample of oﬀ-patent pharmaceuticals facing generic competition. Initially, the in-
dex price system covered six chemical substances: Citalopram (depression), Omeprazol
(antiulcer), Cetirizin (allergy), Loratadin (allergy), Enalapril (high blood pressure) and
Lisinopril (high blood pressure). In June 2004 Simvastatin (high cholesterol) was included.
The choice of drugs were based on two criteria: first, they should cover a wide set of dis-
eases, and not be concentrated within one particular disease type; second, the selected
drugs should be high-volume drugs.13 The government decided to terminate the system
by the end of 2004, arguing that the price reductions and cost savings were lower than
expected.14 Thus, in total the system ran for almost two years.
In calculating the index (reference) price, the government first clustered together drugs
with the same chemical substance. Within each substance group, drugs were classified
into subgroups depending on package size and dosage in order to adjust for cost variation.
Then the government calculated the index price, defined as the sales weighted average
12The Norwegian basket of "comparable" countries consists of Austria, Belgium, Danmark, Finland,
Germany, Irland, the Netherlands, Sweden and the UK. Southern and Eastern European countries, as well
as France and Switzerland, are excluded. If the product is not yet launched in any of the countries in the
basket, the price cap will be determined by negotiations between the producer and the regulator.
13The first criterion is helpful for identification purposes since it provides us with a proper control group.
The second criteria could potentially be a problem if the selected drugs diﬀer from the non-selected drugs.
In Section 4, we therefore perform a pre-test, showing no significant diﬀerences in prices and market shares
for the treatment (reference priced drugs) and the control (price capped drugs) group.
14The decision was based on an evaluation report, using data until February 2004. As will be shown
below, our analysis strongly indicates that the evaluation was carried out too early. Price and market
share eﬀects became substantial after some time, especially during 2004.
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brand-name and generic price, for each subgroup. For the six chemical substances initially
included, there were 16 index prices in total. The government repeated this exercise every
three months, resulting in a revised index price for every quarter of a year. Thus, if
generics increase their market share and/or there is a net price reduction in brand-name
and generic prices, this would induce a lower index price for the next period. In other
words, the index price system can be classified as an endogenous reference price system,
as explained in the theory section (Section 2).
The index price system provided strong incentives for generic substitution at pharmacy
level. The pharmacies obtained the positive margin of selling a (generic) drug priced
lower than the reference price. However, they also faced the negative margin of selling a
(brand-name) drug priced higher than the reference price. Thus, we would expect that
the pharmacies would suggest a generic substitute to patients unless the physicians made
reservations on the prescriptions, which they could do if they provided a particular reason
(e.g., drug compliance for old patients).
However, if the patients refused generic substitution, they had to cover the price dif-
ference between the higher priced brand-name drug and the index price, as common under
reference pricing. In addition, patients in Norway are required to pay coinsurance, which
is currently 36 percent of the price of the drug chosen, with an expenditure cap of 400
NOK per script and 1,350 NOK per year. All drug expenditures above these caps would
be fully covered by the social security scheme.
4 Data and descriptive statistics
In the empirical analysis we use data from Farmastat.15 Their database includes in-
formation on sales value and volume for each package of drugs sold at the Norwegian
pharmaceutical market. Values are in pharmacy purchase prices and volumes in defined
daily doses (DDD) for the active substance according to the ATC-code system.16 The
15Farmastat is a company specialised in provision of pharmaceutical statistics. The company is owned
by the Norwegian Association of Pharmaceutical Manufacturers.
16The ATC-code system is used by the World Health Organization to classify pharmaceutical substances
according to their chemical, pharmacological and therapeutic properties. Pharmaceuticals sharing the same
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database also provides detailed information about product name, manufacturer, launch
date, whether the product is a brand-name or a generic drug, package size, dosage, etc.
From this database we have information on all oﬀ-patent prescription drugs within
the 40 largest ATC groups (in terms of sales volume) over a four year period from 1st of
January 2001 to 31st of December 2004. Our empirical strategy relies on a comparison of
drugs subject to reference pricing with drugs under price cap regulation. Since most of
the drugs in the index price system faced generic competition for a relatively short period
before they came subject to the reform, we only include molecules with generic entry after
1st of January 1998 in our sample. This leaves us with 24 ATC groups. Table 1 lists main
characteristics of these molecules.
[ Table 1 about here ]
The “Market share” variable in Table 1 gives the proportion of sales of brand-names
compared to sales of generics within each ATC group. The "Relative price" variable is
calculated as brand-name prices divided by the quantity weighted average of generic drug
prices for each substance. All prices are deflated using the consumer-price index. The
table also provides information the number of generic competitors within each of the 24
substances, as well as the degree of therapeutic competition measured by the number of
ATC groups having the same three first characters in their ATC code. In the analysis
we divide time into periods of one month. Substances that face generic competition over
the total sample period are therefore represented with 48 observations in the data set.
Finally, there is a column indicating whether or not the substance is exposed to reference
pricing.17
The main objective in the empirical analyses is to test the hypotheses following from
Proposition 3 in Section 2. The first hypothesis postulates that when switching from price
seven-digit ATC-code have the same ingredients and are considered equivalent in the treatment of a given
disease.
17Notice that the ATC group C10AA01 (simvastatin) was included in the reference price system in June
2004, while the rest of the ATC groups subject to reference pricing was included when the reform was
initiated in March 2003.
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cap regulation to reference pricing one would expect an increase in generic market shares.
In Table 2 we compare average market shares for brand-names subject to reference pricing
before and during the reference pricing period with average market shares for brand-names
subject to price cap regulation over the same period. From the table we see that while
there has been a decrease in brand-name market shares for both groups, the decrease is
substantially larger for the drugs subject to reference pricing.
[ Table 2 about here ]
Our second hypothesis postulates that when switching from price cap regulation to
reference pricing, one would expect a reduction in brand-name and generic drug prices,
and a reduction in relative drug prices. The descriptive statistics in Table 2 seem to
confirm this. For drugs subject to reference pricing, we see a reduction in the average
price for both brand-names and generics, with the eﬀect being stronger for the brand-
names, resulting in an 8.5 percent decrease in relative prices. The changes in relative and
average prices for drugs subject to price cap regulation are much more modest over the
same period.
5 Empirical method and results
In this section we analyse the eﬀect of introducing reference pricing on three diﬀerent out-
comes. First, we focus on how reference pricing impact relative branded-generic prices in
order to test whether prices tend to converge towards the reference price. We also estimate
the eﬀects on average brand-name prices and average generic prices separately, such that
we can determine which prices that drive potential changes in the relative prices. Second,
we analyse the impact of reference pricing on generic competition, measured inversely by
brand-name market shares. Finally, we estimate the impact of reference pricing on average
prices at molecule level, which enable us to draw some policy implications of the policy
reform.
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Our estimating strategy relies on a comparison of the seven molecules aﬀected by
reference pricing (the treatment group) to similar molecules not subject to reference pricing
(the control group). Having panel data, we are able to compare inter-temporal variation
in outcomes before and after the imposition of the reform. Therefore, identification relies
not only on before-after comparison, but also on comparison of variations in outcomes for
molecules subject to reference pricing with variation in outcomes for molecules not subject
to this reform.
In the analyses, we estimate diﬀerent versions of the following fixed eﬀect model:
Yit = X0itβ + ai + δt + αDit + εit, (27)
where Yit is one of three outcomes (relative prices, brand-name market share, or average
molecule prices) described above for molecule i at time t. ai is a molecule fixed eﬀect, δt
is a period specific eﬀect common to all molecules, εit represents unobserved time varying
factors that aﬀect outcomes,X0it contains observable variables, andDit is a dummy variable
indicating whether or not molecule i is subject to reference pricing at time t. The eﬀect
of introducing reference pricing is captured by α and the eﬀect of the control variables by
the vector β.
An important assumption is that εit is uncorrelated with Dit (as well as with X0it and
δt). This implies that, after controlling for covariates and molecule specific eﬀects in the
pre-reform period, the price trends for drugs subject to reference pricing should not diﬀer
from price trends for drugs subject to price cap regulation. A test of this assumption is
presented in Table 3.
[ Table 3 about here ]
Here we only use observations prior to the reference price reform. In order to compare
the pre-reform trends in prices and market shares for drugs in the treatment and control
group, we include interactions between the period dummies and a variable indicating
treated molecules (in the post-reform period). If the interactions are insignificant, this
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is an indication of a legitimate control group, i.e., that unobservable factors aﬀecting
prices are uncorrelated with the probability that a given molecule is in the treatment
group. As evident from Table 3, all interactions are statistically insignificant in all three
models. In addition, F-tests suggest that the interactions are jointly insignificant. These
results indicate that market shares, relative prices and average prices for drugs in the two
diﬀerent groups are following the same general trend before the reference pricing reform
was implemented. We therefore conclude that the comparison group is legitimate.
We start out by examining the impact of reference pricing on relative prices, where
relative prices are measured as the ratio of brand-name prices and the volume-weighted
average generic prices. The results from this regression are presented in column 2 in Table
4. Controlling for the number of therapeutic competitors, and period and molecule specific
eﬀects, we find that reference pricing has a negative, though weak, significant eﬀect on
relative prices.
[ Table 4 about here ]
A possible explanation for the decline in relative prices could be price convergence
towards the reference price, as suggested by Danzon and Liu (1996) and Danzon and
Ketcham (2004). However, as shown in the theory section, such price convergence only
happens if the reference price is exogenous, i.e. fixed at some level between the brand-
name and the generic price. If the reference price is endogenous, then the generic producers
have a strategic incentive to lower their price in order to reduce the reference price, which
makes the brand-name relatively more expensive. If this is the case, the reduction in
relative prices must be caused by a larger reduction in brand-name prices than in generic
prices.
To decompose the eﬀect of reference pricing on relative prices, we estimate a fixed
eﬀect model where we use the logarithm of average prices of brand-names and generics as
the dependent variable (thus having two price observations per molecule per time period).
By including an interaction between the reference price indicator and the brand-name
indicator, we can separate the price eﬀect of reference pricing on brand-names from the
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price eﬀect on generics. In the regression we include a brand-name dummy and further
control for the number of generic and therapeutic competitors. The results from the
regression are reported in Table 5.
[ Table 5 about here ]
We see that reference pricing leads to a reduction in both brand-name and generic
prices. The estimated decrease in average prices is quite substantial; around 21 percent
for generics and 36 percent for brand-names. Thus, the (weak) negative impact of reference
pricing on relative prices is due to a larger drop in brand-name than generic prices. Since
the reference price in Norway was calculated as a weighted average of brand-name and
generic prices, this can explain why we do not observe price convergence in our data.
We then turn to the analysis of the impact of reference pricing on generic competition.
The eﬀect of reference pricing on generic competition is not a priori evident, as pointed
out in the theory section. Reference pricing changes the co-payment structure, making the
brand-name drug relatively more expensive than the generics, which increases the generics’
market share for given prices. However, the brand-names respond to reference pricing by
lowering their prices in order to retain their market shares. The net eﬀect on market
shares is thus determined by the relative strength of these two counteracting eﬀects.
The dependent variable in the analysis is the brand-names’ market shares (as a per-
cent). This measure of generic competition has been used in previous work, for instance,
Aronsson et al. (2001).18 In the regressions we control for molecule and period specific
eﬀects, as well as the number of therapeutic competitors, and the relative price between
brand-names and generics. The results are presented in column 3 in Table 4 above.
We find that the imposition of reference pricing leads to a significant (13.8 percent)
reduction in brand-name market shares. Since we control for relative prices in the regres-
sion, we can interpret this decrease as a direct demand response to reference pricing and
18Alternatively, we could measure the eﬀect on the number of generic competitors, the Herfindahl-index,
etc. The measures are, however, highly correlated and provide qualitatively similar results.
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the corresponding change in the co-payment structure. The brand-name price responses
pull in the opposite direction, but we find that the eﬀect is neglible, and that changes in
relative prices have no significant impact (at the five percent level) on the brand-name
market shares in the regression.
A potential problem in this regression is that relative prices might be endogenous.
While relative branded-generic prices might explain market shares, market shares might
also influence firms price setting and thus relative prices. We therefore employ a fixed eﬀect
IV-model where we use relative prices in period t− 1 as an instrument. The results from
the IV-regression are, however, quite similar to the results presented in Table 4 (see Table
A.1 in Appendix A). We therefore choose not to focus on the results from this regression.
Finally, we quantify the eﬀect of reference pricing on average molecule level prices.
Qualitatively, the impact on average prices is evident, since we have established that
reference pricing leads to lower brand-name and generic prices as well as lower brand-
name market shares. However, for policy implications it is of interest to quantify the
eﬀect.
The dependent variable in the regression is the logarithm of the average price at mole-
cule level, where we use the market shares of brand-names and generics as weights. We
control for molecule and time period specific eﬀects, as well as the number of generic and
therapeutic competitors within each ATC code.
[ Table 6 about here ]
As evident from Table 6, we find that reference pricing lowers average molecule prices
with more than 30 percent. This is a quite significant price reduction, especially when
taking into account that Norway has a relatively strict price cap regime, as explained
in Section 3. Since total demand for prescription drugs is highly price inelastice, the 30
percent reduction in average molecule prices strongly indicates substantial cost savings of
introducing reference pricing in the pharmaceutical oﬀ-patent market.
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6 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we have analysed the relationship between regulation, generic competition
and pharmaceutical prices. In the theoretical part of the paper, we have applied a vertical
diﬀerentiation model to derive two main predictions for the subsequent empirical study:
(i) Switching from price cap regulation to RP leads to an increase in generic market
shares; (ii) Given that price cap regulation is not excessively strict, switching from price
cap regulation to RP leads to a reduction in brand-name and generic drug prices and a
reduction in relative drug prices. In the empirical part of the paper, we have exploited
a natural policy experiment — where reference pricing replaced price cap regulation for
only sub-sample of the oﬀ-patent drugs on the Norwegian market — to identify price and
competition eﬀects of the two regulatory regimes.
Our paper provides three main findings. Compared with price cap regulation, (i) RP
leads to price reductions of both brand-names and generics, with the eﬀect being stronger
for the former group of drugs, resulting in (slightly) lower relative prices; (ii) RP stimulates
generic competition by substantially lowering the brand-names’ market shares; and (iii)
RP results in considerably lower average prices at molecule level, suggesting substantial
cost savings. Thus, for the oﬀ-patent market, reference pricing is clearly more favourable
than price cap regulation.
By way of conclusion, we would like to identify a couple of aspects that might poten-
tially reduce the strength of our conclusions. First, there might be unintended cross-price
eﬀects of reference pricing to non-referenced, therapeutic substitutes, as shown — theoret-
ically and empirically — by Brekke et al. (2007a,b). If the therapeutic substitutes also
are oﬀ-patent, this might not be a problem. However, if the therapeutic substitute is
an on-patent product, then reference pricing might negatively aﬀect the patent rent by
inducing lower prices. Second, reference pricing might also induce unintended trade-oﬀ be-
tween patient health gains and co-payments (see, e.g., Lopez-Casasnovas and Puig-Junoy,
2000). If patients trade-oﬀ health gains of drug therapy against co-payments, then radical
changes in co-payments induced by reference pricing might lead some patients to choose
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a less suitable and/or lower quality drug. This problem is perceived to be more severe
under therapeutic than generic reference pricing. However, Brekke et al. (2007b) show,
in a theoretical analysis, that this is not necessarily correct.
Eﬀects of regulatory regimes, like price cap regulation and reference pricing, on inno-
vation incentives and health outcomes are two very important issues that deserve to be
examined much more carefully.19 However, both issues are clearly beyond the scope of the
present study, so we leave them for future research.
7 Appendix A: Fixed eﬀect IV-model
[ Tabel A.1 here ]
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Table 1. Sample characteristics 
ATC-code Market share  Relative 
price 
Subject to 
ref. pricing 
Number 
of 
generics1 
Number of 
therapeutic 
competitors.2 
Number of 
Observations 
A02BC01 68.86 (14.03) 1.28 (0.09) Yes 1 9 48 
A10BA02 81.84 (4.72) 1.23 (0.13) No 5 9 48 
A10BB01 95.24 (7.81) 1.26 (0.11) No 1 9 33 
C08CA01 50.39 (15.14) 1.35 (0.15) Yes 5 1 10 
C09AA02 71.03 (21.77) 1.54 (0.16) Yes 6 4 48 
C09AA03 71.93 (21.92) 1.54 (0.14) Yes 5 4 48 
C09BA02 58.48 (10.96) 1.32 (0.05) No 2 1 24 
C10AA01 58.12 (17.92) 1.28 (0.12) Yes 5 4 21 
C10AA02 53.19 (19.63) 1.36 (0.15) No 1 4 17 
H02AB02 30.25 (5.78) 0.98 (0.09) No 2 8 12 
J01FA01 75.74 (4.19) 1.76 (0.10) No 1 0 48 
J01MA02 95.93 (8.28) 1.18 (0.12) No 2 0 26 
M01AB05 80.11 (8.00) 1.24 (0.75) No 3 14 48 
N03AF02 98.74 (1.34) 2.06 (0.49) No 1 14 12 
N05AH02 50.09 (20.10) 1.31 (0.03) No 1 6 48 
N05BA12 97.67 (1.01) 1.59 (0.10) No 1 3 17 
N05BE01 55.29 (15.69) 1.37 (0.05) No 3 6 48 
N05CF02 71.99 (13.02) 1.87 (0.21) No 2 3 32 
N06AB03 77.69 (21.37) 1.30 (0.16) No 1 15 36 
N06AB04 67.37 (29.81) 1.23 (0.16) Yes 5 15 32 
N06AB05 64.70 (25.33) 1.18 (0.07) No 4 15 18 
N06AG02 73.77 (13.12) 1.41 (0.04) No 2 15 27 
R06AE07 49.92 (18.05) 1.19 (0.12) Yes 6 11 34 
R06AX13 74.51 (18.03) 1.13 (0.08) Yes 6 17 48 
1 Largest number of generics through the sample period. 2 Largest numbers of therapeutic competitors through 
the sample period. 
 
 
 
Table 2. Market shares, relative prices and average prices before and during the reference 
pricing period. 
 Drugs subject to reference 
pricing 
Drugs subject to price cap 
regulation 
 Before the 
reference 
pricing period 
During the 
reference 
pricing period 
Before the 
reference 
pricing period 
During the 
reference 
pricing period 
Market shares brand 
names 
87.26 (12.13) 50.16 (13.17) 79.86 (17.86) 67.66 (21.29) 
Relative prices 1.40 (0.21) 1.28 (0.21) 1.41 (0.44) 1.37 (0.25) 
Average prices brand 
names 
5.10 (3.88) 3.91 (2.78) 7.46 (6.48) 7.74 (6.41) 
Average prices generics 3.92 (2.81) 3.42 (2.31) 6.39 (5.43) 6.40 (5.75) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
Table 3. Testing for pre-reform differences in price and market share trends. Fixed effect 
results with robust standard errors. 
 Relative prices Ln_mean prices Market shares 
Interaction period 1 -0.14 (0.35) 0.01 (0.16) 4.84 (4.94) 
Interaction period 2 -0.06 (0.29) -0.07 (0.18) 7.08 (5.73) 
Interaction period 3 -0.27 (0.25) -0.07 (0.14) 8.72 (6.03) 
Interaction period 4 -0.27 (0.33) -0.09 (0.17) 4.66 (4.60) 
Interaction period 5 -0.30 (0.33) -0.14 (0.17) 3.25 (4.11) 
Interaction period 6 -0.06 (0.14) 0.02 (0.09) 8.14 (7.36) 
Interaction period 7 -0.09 (0.13) 0.01 (0.09) 2.63 (4.29) 
Interaction period 8 -0.07 (0.13) -0.03 (0.09) 2.16 (4.14) 
Interaction period 9 0.05 (0.14) -0.02 (0.09) 1.26 (3.95) 
Interaction period 10 -0.04 (0.32) -0.07 (0.08) 1.30 (3.88) 
Interaction period 11 0.03 (0.12) -0.03 (0.08) 3.03 (5.93) 
Interaction period 12 0.01 (0.12) -0.04 (0.08) 2.01 (5.68) 
Interaction period 13 - - - 
Interaction period 14 -0.01 (0.11) 0.01 (0.07) 0.55 (4.97) 
Interaction period 15 -0.01 (0.11) 0.03 (0.07) 6.05 (5.93) 
Interaction period 16 -0.03 (0.11) 0.04 (0.07) 2.59 (4.76) 
Interaction period 17 -0.02 (0.11) 0.04 (0.07) 0.51 (3.99) 
Interaction period 18 -0.01 (0.12) 0.03 (0.07) -1.04 (4.28) 
Interaction period 19 0.09 (0.11) 0.07 (0.07) -1.77 (4.50) 
Interaction period 20 0.12 (0.11) 0.06 (0.07) 0.18 (4.39) 
Interaction period 21 0.13 (0.12) 0.07 (0.07) -3.64 (4.08) 
Interaction period 22 0.10 (0.10) 0.06 (0.07) -6.02 (5.17) 
Interaction period 23 0.14 (0.11) 0.08 (0.07) -2.06 (4.73) 
Interaction period 24 0.16 (0.11) 0.09 (0.07) -0.76 (5.12) 
Interaction period 25 0.13 (0.11) 0.06 (0.07) -6.16 (5.00) 
Interaction period 26 0.05 (0.13) 0.07 (0.08) -3.53 (5.29) 
Relative prices - - -0.10 (0.45) 
Number of generics - -0.04* (0.02) - 
Number of therapeutic 
competitors 
-0.02 (0.01) -0.02 (0.01) -0.17 (0.45) 
Molecule dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Period dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Joint insignificance of 
interactions (Prob>F) 
.866 .877 .711 
Number of observations 334 334 334 
Number of products 20 20 20 
R-squared .15 .25 .40 
**: significant at the 1 percent level, *: significant at the 5 percent level.  
 
 
Table 4. Effects of reference pricing on relative prices and market shares. Fixed effect models 
with robust standard errors. 
 Relative price Market share 
Relative price - -1.7576 (1.0690) 
Products subject to reference pricing -0.0896** (0.0238) -13.7988** (1.6785) 
Number of therapeutic competitors -0.0396* (0.0168) 2.7148** (0.3938) 
Constant 1.9194** (0.2640) 69.7341** (4.2673) 
Period dummies Yes Yes 
Molecule dummies Yes Yes 
Number of observations 783 783 
Number of ATC groups 24 24 
R-squared 0.13 0.72 
**: significant at the 1 percent level, *: significant at the 5 percent level.  
 
  
 
Table 5. Effects of reference pricing on log of average brand-name and generic prices. Fixed 
effect models with robust standard errors. 
Generics subject to reference pricing -0.2113** (0.0196) 
Brand names subject to reference pricing -0.1479** (0.0194) 
Brand names 0.2625** (0.0084) 
Number of therapeutic competitors -0.0264** (0.0056) 
Number of generics 0.0073 (0.0052) 
Constant 1.6956** (0.0814) 
Period dummies Yes 
Molecule dummies Yes 
Number of observations 1536 
Number of ATC groups 24 
R-squared 0.61 
**: significant at the 1 percent level, *: significant at the 5 percent level. 
 
 
Table 6. Effects of reference pricing on log of average prices. Fixed effect models with robust 
standard errors. 
Drugs subject to reference pricing -0.3028** (0.0236) 
Number of therapeutic competitors -0.0392** (0.0087) 
Number of generics 0.0061 (0.0068) 
Constant 2.1622** (0.1292) 
Period dummies Yes 
Molecule dummies Yes 
Number of observations 783 
Number of ATC groups 24 
R-squared 0.64 
**: significant at the 1 percent level, *: significant at the 5 percent level. 
 
 
Table A.1. Effects of reference pricing on market shares. Fixed effect IV-model. 
 First step Second step 
Relative price - 0.0508 (1.9383) 
Products subject to reference pricing -0.0155 (0.0202) -12.8326** (1.4689) 
Number of therapeutic competitors 0.0006 (0.0054) 2.9695** (0.3904) 
Relative price (t-1) 0.7797** (0.0208) - 
Constant 0.1198 (0.0706) 65.5888** (4.7145) 
Period dummies Yes Yes 
Molecule dummies Yes Yes 
Number of observations 759 759 
Number of molecules 24 24 
R-squared 0.71 0.72 
**: significant at the 1 percent level, *: significant at the 5 percent level. 
 
Norges
Handelshøyskole
Norwegian School of Economics 
and Business Administration
NHH
Helleveien 30
NO-5045 Bergen
Norway
Tlf/Tel: +47 55 95 90 00
Faks/Fax: +47 55 95 91 00
nhh.postmottak@nhh.no
www.nhh.no
